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REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR TRADE: EUROPEAN
AND UNITED STATES VIEWS
Elisabeth Zollert
On September 17, 1984, the Council of the European
Communities adopted Regulation 2641/84 in order to strengthen the
common commercial policy against illicit commercial practices.' This
Regulation represents a counterpart to section 301 of the United
States' Trade Act of 1974, which gives the President sweeping
authority to retaliate against unfair trade practices of foreign
governments. 2 Section 301 aims "to enforce" the rights of the United
States under any trade agreement. The section also purports "to
respond" to any action that is either inconsistent with a trade
agreement or "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory."'3 The
European Regulation, on the other hand, seeks to "ensure full
exercise of the Community's rights" and to "respond to any illicit
commercial practice."4 Despite their semantic differences, both texts
provide unilateral remedies for unfair or illicit trade practices of
foreign states. The two instruments illustrate that subjects of
international law have not surrendered the power to respond
unilaterally to unfair practices or to noncompliance with international
rules.
The new European Regulation significantly extends the external
powers of the Community.5 Prior to the enactment of the Regulation,
the Community had primarily developed its external competence in
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1. O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L. 252) (1984), 1-6 [hereinafter cited as European
Regulation]. See also Atwood, The European Economic Community's New Measures
Against Unfair Practices in International Trade: Implications for United States Exporters,
19 INT'L LAW. 361 (1985).
2. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (as amended 1984).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
4. European Regulation, supra note 1, at 1.
5. For a general view, see, e.g., 12 LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTf- ECONOMIQUE
EUROPtENNE: RELATIONS EXTfRIEURES (J. Mgret, M. Waelbroeck, J.V. Louis, D.
Vignes, J.L. Dewost & P. Briiuckner eds. 1980).
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implementing the common commercial policy 6 through contractual
relations.7 The European Economic Community Treaty (EEC
Treaty)8 did not afford the Community sufficient protection. 9 In
particular, the Treaty did not equip the Community to cope with
aggressive international competition; nor did it offer an offensive
scheme to deter protectionist measures by third countries. In short,
the Treaty made only minimal provisions for unilateral action to
counter impediments known as non-tariff barriers, which distort
international trade. Unlike the United States, the Community had no
remedy comparable to that of section 301 of the Trade Act.' 0
6. The common commercial policy is one of the basic tenets of the Common Market.
It derives from the establishment of a common customs tariff which necessarily entails a
common attitude of Member States toward nonmember states. See Flory, Commercial
Policy and Development Policy, in THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW, THE EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES SERIES 375 (1981).
7. An exception exists in the imposition of economic "sanctions" against a third state
in the event of serious international crises. See, e.g., Schroder, Wirtschaftssanktionen des
Europafiche Gemeinschaften gegeniiber Drittstaaten, 23 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 111
(1980); Kuyper, Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness Under Community
and International Law, in ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 141 (D.
O'Keeffe & H. Schermers eds. 1982); Stein, European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a
Component of the European Foreign Affairs System, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES
UND OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [Z.a.o.R.V.] 49 (1983). In such cases the
Community can implement its unilateral power even though the international offense has
not affected the Community's interests.
8. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
9. In establishing the framework for the common commercial policy, the "founding
fathers" of the EEC arguably drafted the Treaty so as to make unilateral protective
measures available. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 115 ("Commission shall authorize
Member States to take the necessary protective measures" if the practices of one Member
State lead to economic difficulties in another). See also Reich, La politique commerciale
commune de la C.E.E. et le contrdle de l'utilisation de la clause de sauvegarde de Particle
115 du traiti C.E.E., 14 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPPIEN [R.T.D.E.] 33
(1978). Article 113 also lists "measures to protect trade" as one of the "uniform
principles" that form the basis for the common commerical policy; collective protection of
the Community under article 113, however, is clearly a matter within the exclusive
competence of the Community as a whole. Although article 235 does not specifically
address unilateral protective measures, it authorizes the Council to take "appropriate
measures" necessary to attain Community objectives, even if the Treaty "has not provided
the necessary powers."
10. The United States first invoked section 301 against the Community after the
Treasury Department failed to countervail the remission of a value-added tax on
Community exports of steel. See Easton & Lang, A Comment: Kaye and Plaia on Section
33 7-Pricing Jurisdiction, 3 INT'L T.L.J. 359, 377 n.53 (1978). Of the 48 complaints of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), half have been filed against the Community
and/or its Member States. The disputes cover levies on egg albumin (case 301-3), surety
deposit on canned fruit juices (case 301-4), prices on raisins imports (case 301-47), alleged
subsidies on malt (case 301-5), wheat (case 301-16), wheat flour (case 301-6), sugar (case
301-20), poultry (case 301-23), pasta (case 301-25), canned peaches and pears (case 301-26),
levies on sugars added to canned fruits (case 301-7), requirements for livestock feed (case
301-8), duties on citrus fruits (case 301-11), alleged subsidies on steel (cases 301-28, 301-29,
301-33) and satellite launching services offered by Arianespace (case 301-46). Each
complaint provides an opportunity for the United States to scrutinize Community law.
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Several Member States did not recognize the need for such a
regulation. The main concern of these countries was to insulate the
Community from protectionist trends. Other delegations, however,
emphasized the importance of filling a lacuna in the common
commercial policy. These delegations warned against individual
actions by Member States that could dismantle the common
commercial policy and jeopardize the Community's interests.
Attainment of a common commercial policy was thus hindered by
"the conflict arising between the establishment of a common
commercial policy and national protective measures, as well as [by]
the use or misuse made by Member States of escape-clauses under
Article 115 of the Treaty."11
To strengthen its commercial policy, the Community had two
options. First, it could have adopted a restrictive approach by
identifying the specific trade practices against which it would respond.
Such an enumeration would have made the instrument inefficient
because an exhaustive list of illicit or unfair practices was unfeasible.
A second approach was to parallel section 301 by drafting a document
that would have subjected any "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or
discriminatory" practice to retaliation. The Commission of the
European Communities (the Commission) squarely rejected this latter
approach because it was "potentially inconsistent" with provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).12 The
Commission maintained that section 301 had never generated effective
trade countermeasures because of this potential inconsistency. 13
Instead, the Commission claimed to have chosen a middle course
which differed from that of section 301. Both the European and
United States instruments, however, illustrate unilateral responses to
international offenses. Both authorize a state to enforce its rights by
The 1983 Commission's general report indicated that the EEC-U.S. trade relations "once
again became severely strained as a result of United States measures against Community
exports of special steels and agricultural products." Commission of the European
Communities, 17 General Report 262 (1983) [hereinafter cited as General Report]. In its
1982 Report, the Commission found a "more aggressive [U.S.] attitude towards anything
that is perceived as 'unfair' competition in international economic relations." 16 General
Report 244 (1982). More specifically, the Commission viewed the Reagan administration's
trade policy as "aggressive assertion of U.S. rights, as in the case of sustained pressure since
summer 1981 for adjustment of certain aspects of the common agricultural policy, backed
up by a number of complaints lodged by agricultural pressure groups under Section 301 of
the Trade Act." 15 General Report 258 (1981) (emphasis added).
11. Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615, 638 (1979).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. See, e.g., GATT art. I(1) (most-
favored nation treatment).
13. See Proposal from the Commission to the Council (83) 87 final, (Brussels, Feb. 28,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Proposal].
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taking countermeasures against a second state which, in the first
state's view, has violated an international obligation. Although the
countermeasures in both texts apply only to international trade
matters, they exemplify peacetime unilateral remedies for
international offenses, often known as nonviolent "sanctions" in
international law. 14
In order to highlight some general trends of unilateral remedies,
this Article compares the text of Regulation 2641/84 with that of
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Section one discusses the
conditions justifying action. Section two focuses on the scope of
permissible action. The Article concludes that despite European
contentions to the contrary, the European Regulation and section 301
share important similarities.
I. THE CONDITIONS FOR ACTION
Both section 301 and the European Regulation subject unilateral
responses to definite procedural and substantive conditions. Although
the procedural conditions in the European Regulation are similar to
those in section 301, the substantive requirements are quite different.
A. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
The major procedural feature shared by the European Regula-
tion15 and section 30116 is a mechanism allowing private parties to file
complaints against foreign states. Public parties may also file com-
14. See E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES (1984) and ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH UNITED
STATES LEGISLATION (1985). For an example of a case where one state took
countermeasures against another state, see Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement
(U.S. v. Fr.) (Decision of Dec. 9, 1978), 18 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 417, 443 (1978). See
also Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration - Or Both? The 1978 United States-France
Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 785, 802-06 (1980); Dutheil de ]a Rochare,
L'interprdtation de 1' accord franco-amdricain relatif au transport adrien international-
Changement d'appareils d Londres-Sentence du 9 ddcembre 1978, 25 ANNUAIRE
FRANgAIS DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL [A.F.D.I.] 314 (1979). For further developments
since the Award, see Report on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 39, 39-
47; Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 115, 115-
22; Malanczuk, Countermeasures and Self-Defense As Circumstances Precluding
Wrongfulness in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
43 Z.a.dR.V. 705, 718 (1983).
15. European Regulation, supra note I , art. 3.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (as amended 1984). The Senate Committee "felt that in
order to make section 301 a truly effective tool for protecting U.S. commerce from burden-
some foreign restrictions, individual parties should be able to petition the Government in
order to seek recourse against specific foreign actions adversely affecting their interests.
This would also expedite the process by which burdensome foreign restrictions can be
brought to the attention of the relevant agencies in the U.S. Government." SENATE
FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7305.
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plaints. For example, public party complaints may be filed by the
President or Special Trade Representative of the United States under
section 301 and by a Member State under the European Regulation.
Under both the European Regulation and section 301, private
complaints originate in anti-dumping and countervailing duty law17
authorizing an industry to initiate investigations in the United States
and in the European Community. Interestingly, neither GATT (arti-
cle VI) nor the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code formally
entitles private individuals or corporations to commence a procedure
against a foreign sovereign state;18 under those provisions, private
complaints against foreign countries remain within the sole discretion
of each state. Nevertheless, such provisions actually authorize private
parties to carry out legal procedures against a foreign sovereign state.
The mere existence of these private-action provisions illustrates an
interesting feature in the development of foreign sovereign immunity
doctrine. It is not surprising that such development has taken place in
the specific area of international trade because trade is the most regu-
lated area of international intercourse.
Under the European Regulation and section 301, private com-
plaints permit private parties to commence full-fledged legal battles
against foreign states. Although the initial action is not brought in a
court, the individual's right is nevertheless against a foreign sover-
eign.' 9 Governmental trade regulations, no matter how unfair, are
nonetheless genuine acts of state which are not comparable to com-
mercial activities. Trade regulations are acts jure imperil which, in
theory, should be "immune." However, neither section 301 nor the
European Regulation articulates a reasonable limitation on the types
of government actions that may be challenged. This ability of private
parties to question the validity of certain foreign legislative acts repre-
sents an important departure from classical foreign sovereign immu-
17. For United States law, see 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (1982); for Community law, see
EEC Council Regulation, O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. 3017), art. 5 (20 Dec. 1979) (on protection
against dumped or subsidized imports from non-Member countries). Although section 301
was enacted to combat barriers to U.S. exports, the provision may be invoked against for-
eign import subsidies. A claimant may not, however, file both section 301 and counter-
vailing actions. See, e.g., Petition of AFL-CIO, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,059 (1982) (investigation
of alleged export credit subsidies granted by Canada was terminated because some allega-
tions were subject to CVD investigations). Recent cases suggest that section 301 may enti-
tle a petitioner to a broadened definition of "subsidy." See, e.g., Petition of Committee of
Domestic Steel Wire Rope and Specialty Cable Manufacturers, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,790 (1983)
(petition withdrawn).
18. Article 2 of the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code merely refers to
"a written request by or on behalf of the industry affected," leaving the choice free for each
contracting party.
19. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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nity law, under which states were only challenged by other states
through diplomatic channels.
To a limited extent, these trade procedures reinforce the argu-
ments for a more refined approach to the international personality of
individuals. Both section 301 and the European Regulation authorize
actions that affect not only private foreign entities but also the offend-
ing foreign state as a whole by imposing specific countermeasures.
A second feature shared by section 301 and the European Regula-
tion is the nature of the process. In both cases, the procedure is
"transparent," i.e., it is public, adversarial, and administered in con-
formity with due process standards. First, a hearing is held at the
municipal law level and monitored by either the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) 20 or the European Commis-
sion.21 This requirement applies to both private and public investiga-
tions. The unfair trade procedures seek to ascertain sufficient evidence
to justify an investigation. The debate is public; notices of investiga-
tion must be published in the Federal Register or in the Official Jour-
nal of the European Communities; the foreign country is served with
notice of an investigation; all interested parties may make their views
known; written briefs and rebuttals may be presented; and public hear-
ings may be held.22 While these domestic procedures are carried out,
international consultations are requested with the appropriate foreign
state. Under both section 301 and the European Regulation, no action
may be taken before completion of the international procedures.23 In
effect, the Community has incorporated basic due process require-
ments into its law.
Because a private party may initiate an investigation, the possibil-
ity of diplomatic embarrassment exists. When Congress granted a citi-
20. Procedures for Complaints Filed Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 15
C.F.R. § 2006 (as amended 1984).
21. European Regulation, supra note 1, arts. 5-9.
22. Supra notes 20-21.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1982); European Regulation, supra note I, art. 1 l(2)(a). For the
purpose of international consultations, the European Regulation has formally set up an
advisory committee referred to as "the Committee" which consists of representatives of
each Member State and a representative of the Commission as chairman. European Regu-
lation, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
With respect to U.S. provisions, section 301 does not specify which "consultations" must
take place under GATT procedures. Cases may be referred to GATT working parties or
panels. See, e.g., Petition of Nat'l Canners Ass'n, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,635 (1975) (challenging
EC's minimum import prices for canned fruit juices and vegetables). Alternatively, a case
may be subject to GATT article XXII or XXIII consultations. See, e.g., Petition of Florida
Citrus Comm'n, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,567 (1976) (alleging that EC's preferential import duties
on Mediterranean citrus adversely affect U.S. citrus products). Finally, a case may fall
outside GATT resolution. See, e.g., Petition of Nat'l Sugar Processors Ass'n and American
Soybean Ass'n, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,384 (1975) (alleging that EC's requirement that livestock
feed be mixed with domestic nonfat milk unfairly displaces U.S. protein sources such as
soybeans).
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zen the right to enter a complaint against a foreign trade practice
pursuant to section 301, Congress created a means by which private
citizens could attribute all their economic difficulties to unfair foreign
trade practices. Each foreign trade partner of the United States must
realize that its legislation may become subject to inquiry and close
scrutiny under a section 301 challenge.
Rather than a day in court, section 301 entitles every citizen to a
day in the USTR's office. Undoubtedly this private citizen's remedy
has significant constitutional ramifications in the United States. 24 The
remedy may also, however, produce negative consequences under
international law. Subjects of international law are not amenable to
private claims unless the claims are state-supported. Section 301,
however, ignores this customary requirement. The United States gov-
ernment retains no control over the initiation of section 301 actions by
private citizens. Although the President has authority to decide
whether to take action, he remains powerless to stop the investigative
procedure. Of course the stringent conditions with which a private
complaint must comply in order to result in retaliatory measures
counterbalance the executive's lack of control.25 The USTR may
reject petitions on policy grounds alone, but this practice has seldom
been employed. 26
In contrast, a private complaint on behalf of Community produ-
cers under the European Regulation may be rejected as a threshold
matter if the complaint fails to provide sufficient evidence to justify an
investigation. Furthermore, the complaint may be rejected if Commu-
nity interests do not require any action to be taken. Although the
Regulation does not mention possible judicial review of a rejected pri-
vate-party complaint, strong reasons exist for believing that, under
appropriate circumstances, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munity will apply the FEDIOL rule. In FEDIOL,27 the Court stated
that a complainant could not compel the Commission to initiate an
anti-subsidy proceeding as long as "the Commission has observed the
procedural guarantees granted to complainants; ... has [not] commit-
ted manifest errors in its assessment of the facts, [and] has [not] omit-
24. United States authors have devoted scrupulous attention to the constitutional
rights of citizens when foreign affairs are involved. See, e.g., Leigh & Atkeson, Due Process
in the Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 21 Bus. LAW. 853 (1966) and
22 Bus. LAW. 3 (1966); Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of
the Individual in International Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REv. 159 (1965).
25. See infra Section I B (substantive requirements for action).
26. Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of.1974, in 8 MANUAL FOR THE PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW VII-5 (W.K. Ince & L.A. Glick eds. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Ince & Glick].
27. Case 191/82 EEC Seed Crushers and Oil Processors' Federation (FEDIOL) v.
Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 2913 (1983).
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ted to take into consideration any essential matter. ' 2 The Court thus
subjected the Commission's exclusive discretion in evaluating the
"community interest" to the rule of law.
By establishing the FEDIOL criteria, the Court provided a basis
for review of rejected private-party complaints. Section 301 actions
are more worrisome than EEC procedures because rejected private-
party complaints are not subject to judicial review at any stage of the
procedure. 29 Nevertheless, the preliminary investigative procedures
provided by section 301 play an important safeguarding role for the
private claimant.
B. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
The substantive requirements for action under section 301 and
the European Regulation differ in two important respects. First,
whereas section 301 aims to respond to "unfair" foreign trade, the
European Regulation is directed against "illicit" commercial practice.
This semantic difference is not just an academic point. The Commis-
sion consciously chose to use the word "illicit" rather than "unfair". 30
Second, section 301 does not require injury as a prerequisite for inves-
tigation. The European Regulation, in contrast, explicitly requires
that a party suffer injury before bringing a claim. These important
differences illustrate two distinct approaches to the new problems of
international trade.
Section 301 contemplates action by the United States in two dif-
ferent situations. The United States may take action either "to
enforce" U.S. rights or "to respond" to a foreign country's practice.
Despite its different wording, the European Regulation proposes
action in similar situations. The Community may act either "to
respond" to a definite foreign trade practice, or "to ensure full exer-
cise" of the Community's rights. Although there is an important dif-
ference between action "to enforce" and action "to respond", the
drafters of section 301 did not focus on this distinction.3' In the pre-
liminary draft of the Regulation, the Commission stated that action
"to respond" applies, for example, to export restrictions or import
impediments inconsistent with GATT. On the other hand, action "to
28. Id. See Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Determina-
tions After FEDIOL: The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 21 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 539 (1984).
29. A Trade Representative's refusal to act is not judicially reviewable; the USTR need
only publish the basis of a decision. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (1984).
30. Compare Proposal, supra note 13, with European Regulation, supra note 1. See
European Parliament, Report of M.E. Blumenfeld, Doc. 1-376/83, at 11 (June 1, 1983) (the
term "unfair" was considered "too vague").
31. See E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH UNITED STATES
LEGISLATION 137, 144 (1985).
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ensure full exercise of rights" (i.e. "to enforce") applies to settlement
procedures under GATT (article XXIII or Title II of the Subsidies
Code) or to compensatory measures following the application of arti-
cle XIX.32 In these two situations, the right to resort to countermea-
sures has a completely different meaning.
"Responding" to a breach of an international obligation by a for-
eign state is a relatively straightforward process. Responsive actions
follow internationally wrongful acts and are within the scope of inter-
national responsibility. 33 Section 301 and the European Regulation,
however, define the breach differently. Under section 301, the viola-
tion may be an act "inconsistent with" a trade agreement or an act
"unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory." Under the Regula-
tion, however, the violation must be a practice "incompatible with
international law or with the generally accepted rules."
In the preliminary draft of the Regulation, the Commission
asserted that the phrase "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discrimina-
tory" was incompatible with certain GATT provisions. 34 This was
admittedly true until Congress enacted the Trade and Tariff Reform
Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act).35 The 1984 Act, which amended the
Trade Act of 1974, sets forth the following definitions. First, the 1984
Act defines an "unjustifiable" act as an act inconsistent with the inter-
national legal rights of the United States. Under this definition, an
"unjustifiable" act clearly constitutes a breach of an international obli-
gation. Second, the term "discriminatory" by nature involves a
wrongful international act insofar as the obligation not to discriminate
against a foreign state derives from the principle of equality between
states, which in turn is a rule of customary international law.36 Third,
under the 1984 Act, the term "unreasonable" refers to "unfair and
inequitable" practices, which are connected with the principles of rea-
sonableness and prohibition against abuse of rights. 37 These are
admittedly international obligations based upon the principle of good
32. Proposal, supra note 13, at 2.
33. See W. Riphagen, Fifth Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of State
Responsibility (Part Two of the Draft Articles), A/CN.4/380, April 4, 1984.
34. Proposal, supra note 13.
35. Trade Act of 1974 § 304, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(e)(4) (West Supp. 1985) (amending
19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (1980)).
36. See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 105, U.N. Doc. A/3859/1958; Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Thirteenth Session, [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 11, U.N. Doc. A/33/
10/1978; see also Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 192 (Judgment of Aug. 27, 1952).
37. See Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits),
1926 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7, at 30 (Judgment dated May 25, 1926); Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex (Second Phase), 1930 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 24, at 12 (Order of
Dec. 6, 1930); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 46, at 167 (Judgment of June 7, 1932).
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faith.38
The European Community insisted that it would not employ the
methods adopted by the United States in dealing with unfair trade
practices. The Community, however, by defining illicit foreign com-
mercial practices as "any international trade practices incompatible
with international law or with the generally accepted rules,"' 39 reaches
the same result as the United States. The concept of "incompatibil-
ity," however, does not necessarily require that a foreign state's act be
inconsistent with an international obligation. Under European law
generally and under French law specifically, "incompatibility" is the
loosest standard for appraising the legality of a state's act.4° In effect,
the definition of illicit foreign commercial practices in the European
Regulation parallels the United States' prohibition of "unjustifiable,
unreasonable, or discriminatory" trade practices in section 301.
Although the European Commission rejected the United States' choice
of language, the phrase "incompatible with" reflects a similar disre-
gard for restrictive construction of GATT obligations. Like the word
"unreasonable" in section 301, the phrase "incompatible with" in the
European Regulation may refer to any policy that "while not necessar-
ily in violation of, or inconsistent with ... international legal rights
, is otherwise deemed to be unfair and inequitable. '41
The comparison between section 301 and the European Regula-
tion becomes even more complex when one examines whether a state
may "respond" to a breach without having suffered an injury. Under
section 301, the United States may "respond" to a breach without hav-
ing suffered any injury. The European Regulation, in contrast, man-
dates the existence of an injury.
One should note, however, that even a material injury may not be
identical to "damage" to a party. The injury required for action under
the European Regulation is the same type of injury that is required for
action under the European anti-dumping law.42 Moreover, like sec-
tion 301, the European Regulation permits retaliation where a "threat
of injury" is alleged, as long as it is "clearly foreseeable that a particu-
lar situation is likely to develop into actual injury. ' 43 Thus, the
requirement of an injury before commencement of action under the
European Regulation is not as strict as it appears at first glance. Fur-
38. See E. ZOLLER, LA BONNE FoI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 109-22
(1977).
39. European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
40. See 1 C. EISENMANN, COURS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 462-63 (1955); J.
BOULOuIS, DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPfENNES 161 (1984).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3) (as amended 1984).
42. Compare European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 8 with EEC Council Regulation
(No. 3017), supra note 17, art. 4.
43. European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
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thermore, although section 301 does not formally require an injury for
action, the United States has initiated investigations only in cases
where the foreign act has burdened United States trade. For example,
the United States Trade Representative does not permit the use of sec-
tion 301 for "fishing expeditions."' 44 However, the terms "burden"
and "restriction" in section 301 have a much broader scope than the
same terms in the European Regulation. Under section 301, a "bur-
den" or "restriction" includes not only effects on trade but also impact
on "services (including transfer of information) associated with inter-
national trade, whether or not such services are related to specific
goods," or "foreign direct investment by United States persons with
implications for trade in goods or services." '45
Under treaty law, an injury is not required for a state to respond
to a breach. Whenever a contracting party to a treaty does not abide
by that international agreement, the other party is entitled to act in the
same manner by virtue of the exceptio non adimplenti contractus. This
Latin maxim means that whenever a contract is not complied with, the
innocent party may avoid an obligation under the contract that is
identical, similar, or equivalent to the breached obligation (quid pro
quo obligation). This right of immediate action, which exists in both
civil and common law systems, is based upon the principle of reciproc-
ity and applies even when the innocent party has not suffered injury.
Under international law, reciprocal actions are customary entitle-
ments.46 As a result, even though the European Regulation does not
formally permit action without an injury, the Regulation does not
diminish the Community's customary international rights. Any
response taken under the principle of exceptio non adimplenti contrac-
tus, however, must remain within the limits of reciprocity. In other
words, responsive actions must be identical, similar, or equivalent to
the breached obligation. The 1984 Trade and Tariff Reform Act
amendments to section 301 authorize the President to take action on
certain goods or in a specific sector "without regard to whether or not
such goods or sector were involved in the action of the foreign coun-
try."'47 This broad authorization may open the door to reprisals that
theoretically are not legitimate measures under the reciprocity princi-
ple of treaty law. Reciprocity does not authorize the responding state
to take steps outside the field of the offense.
44. Ince & Glick, supra note 26, at VII-5. See, ag., Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 Complaint, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,749 (1975) (petitioners failed to demonstrate significant
trade impact of Canadian quota on U.S. egg imports).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(e)(4) (as amended 1984).
46. See E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH UNITED STATES
LEGISLATION 14-30 (1985).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(2)(B) (as amended 1984).
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Under the law of international responsibility, the right "to
respond" is closely linked to the existence of injury or damage. On its
face, the European Regulation complies more with this norm of inter-
national law than does section 301. However, as mentioned, the his-
tory of section 301 demonstrates that, in practice, investigations under
the section are not initiated without some type of injury. On the other
hand, the European Regulation's injury requirement does not neces-
sarily call for damage to the Community as a whole.
Matters of "enforcing" or "ensuring full exercise" of rights, espe-
cially in the absence of a clear prior breach, present more intricate
problems. Although the Community pledged not to parallel "contro-
versial" section 301, considering the section "potentially inconsistent"
with GATT,48 the Community followed the same practice, although
more artfully, by providing procedures "to ensure full exercise of the
Community's rights." In contrast to section 301, the Regulation vests
the right to trigger enforcement in Member States-not in Community
producers. This distinction in rights derives from the fact that Com-
munity producers must always make a convincing showing of both an
illicit practice and an injury.49 Only a Member State may ask the
Commission to initiate the procedure to ensure full exercise of the
Community's rights.50 Although the phrasing of the Regulation is
ambiguous, Member States apparently must supply the Commission
with evidence of illegality and injury only when they allege that illicit
practices have occurred.5 1 In short, both the United States and the
Community avail themselves of the opportunity to enforce their rights
vis-A-vis other states regardless of the "damage" caused to their own
interests.
Enforcement measures necessarily involve a coercive component.
When coercion accompanies the consequences of a breach, the coer-
cion does not possess the same legal significance as when it is com-
pletely independent from the impact of a breach. Unlike reciprocal
measures, reprisals are by nature coercive devices. When reprisals fol-
low a breach, however, the legitimacy of their coercive component
derives less from the need to obtain compensation for the breach than
from the need to obtain full reparation and return to the status quo
ante.
In contrast, the exercise of coercion upon innocent foreign states
is more difficult to justify. Although the principle of equality between
states is one of the basic tenets of contemporary international society,
48. Proposal, supra note 13, at 2; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
49. European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(l)-(2).
50. Id. art. 4(1).
51. Id. art. 4(2).
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the right of one state to coerce another innocent state remains doubt-
ful. A society of equals precludes one of its members from enjoying a
status superior to that of another. Equality implies respect for the
legitimate rights of other subjects of the law. A state cannot infringe
on the subjective rights of another state when the latter has not com-
mitted a breach.
Like section 301, the European Regulation grants the Commu-
nity enforcement rights. In its preliminary draft, the European Com-
mission raised the prospect of taking action in two situations where no
breach of international obligation has occurred. The first instance
concerns GATT contracting parties that exercise the right to resort to
emergency action over the import of particular products.52 The sec-
ond instance contemplates action against a signator to the Subsidies
Code that initiates an investigation into alleged Community subsi-
dies.53 In the Commission's view, however, these two situations differ
from those authorized by section 301. The Community maintains that
it will take only those measures "which are compatible with existing
international obligations."' 54 Taken literally, this assertion would limit
Community enforcement to either retorsion or reciprocal actions. The
Community's position is clearly untenable because it would, in effect,
prevent the Community from successfully enforcing its own rights
since neither retorsion nor reciprocity, which do not infringe foreign
states subjective rights, entail the coercive component that is essential
in enforcement matters.
II. THE SCOPE OF ACTION
With respect to measures that may be taken against foreign coun-
tries, the differences between section 301 and the European Regulation
appear substantial. Section 301 authorizes the President to take "all
appropriate and feasible action."' 55 The European Regulation, in con-
trast, only provides for measures "compatible with existing interna-
tional obligations and procedures."' 56 Although the soundness of the
Community's self-restraint is questionable, the Commission wisely dis-
tinguishes obligations from procedures. The power to take unilateral
action against a foreign state varies with this distinction.
52. GATT, supra note 12, art. XIX.
53. Proposal, supra note 13, at 2.
54. European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 10(3).
55. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a).
56. European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 10(3).
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A. INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES
Under international law, states are not authorized to take proce-
dural shortcuts when redressing international offenses. As a matter of
law, one must distinguish reciprocal and non-reciprocal actions. If the
contemplated response is solely reciprocal, i.e. identical or equivalent
to the foreign state's action, the response may be implemented at once.
Reciprocal actions are inherently rights of immediate action with the
sole purpose of "reestablishing the symmetry of initial positions
between the parties."' 57 This concept was illustrated in the Case Con-
cerning the Air Service Agreement.58 In that case, the Arbitral Tribu-
nal upheld the action of the Civil Aeronautics Board requiring French
airline companies to file flight schedules. As long as France denied
Pan Am the right to land aircraft in Paris, the United States was enti-
tled to reciprocate immediately by denying the landing of Air France
aircraft en route from Paris to Los Angeles. The response was
equivalent to the breach. 59
Trade matters operate similarly. Under GATT article XXVIII,
for example, a withdrawal of trade concessions may be followed within
six months by a withdrawal of "substantially equivalent concessions."
Under GATT article XIX, affected contracting parties have similar
withdrawal rights following emergencies. The right of immediate
reciprocal action is "so just, so equitable" 60 that it is widely recognized
by every municipal legal system under the principle inadempleti non
est adimplendum.61
Reciprocal remedies, however, are often an ineffective response to
unfair or illicit trade practices and an ineffective means of enforcing
international rights. Some trade practices, such as the imposition of
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), may result from domestic traditions that
do not exist in the injured foreign state. Moreover, even responding
legislation that actually mirrors the breach may prove ineffective.
Mirror legislation usually takes no account of the economic impact of
the breach on the aggrieved party; nor does it consider the effect of the
response upon the offender. Because mirror legislation is often blind
to such considerations, its effectiveness is limited.62 Finally, when
"enforcing" is more important than "responding," reciprocity may
57. Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement, supra note 14, at 445.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 443-444 (V 83). See E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATEAL REMEDIES, supra
note 14, at 133-37.
60. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No.
70, at 7 (Judgment of June 28, 1937) (Anzilotti, J., dissenting).
61. What is not performed is not to be complied with. (Translation by Author.)
62. See E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH UNITED STATES
LEGISLATION 141-42 (1985).
[Vol. 18:227
REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR TRADE
become meaningless; an enforcement measure contains a coercive
component which is not attached to an equalizing reciprocal move.
Enforcement thus involves reprisals, which constitute measures
beyond reciprocity. The Canada-United States Border Broadcast dis-
pute63 illustrates the limited effectiveness of reciprocity. After that
dispute, the chances of Canada's repealing its allegedly "unfair" tax
legislation diminished because the United States response under sec-
tion 232 of the 1984 Act" merely mirrored Canada's unfair
legislation.
Both section 301 and the European Regulation clearly allow
reprisals against foreign nations. After the amendments to the 1984
Act, section 301 became even more explicit in that regard. Congress
expressly granted the President the authority to take sweeping actions
"with regard to any goods or sector-without regard to whether or
not such goods or sector were involved" 65 in the foreign practice. Sim-
ilarly, article 10(3) of the European Regulation authorizes the Com-
munity to resort to genuine reprisals, including raising existing
customs duties or introducing quantitative restrictions.
One should note that both instruments subject enforcement
actions to preliminary diplomatic steps. Section 303 of the Trade Act
formally requires the Trade Representative to "request consultations
with the foreign country."' 66 It specifies that whenever a trade agree-
ment is involved, proceedings must be requested "under the [formal
dispute settlement procedures found within the] agreement." '67 Simi-
larly, article 6 of the European Regulation requires the Commission
not only to notify the representatives of the country concerned, but
also to consult with them. In addition, article 13 precludes action
until the parties have exhausted international proceedings for consul-
tation and dispute settlement. These approaches are consistent with
article 33 of the United Nations Charter, 68 which requires states to
63. 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980). The dispute concerned Canadian tax regulations that
denied an income tax deduction to Canadian advertisers who contracted with U.S. televi-
sion and radio stations located near the U.S.-Canadian border for advertising aimed pri-
marily at the Canadian market.
64. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. 3002 (1984). See
also 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a).
67. Id.
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 33. Article 33 provides:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to
settle their dispute by such means.
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settle their disputes through peaceful means.
On its face, section 301 allows the United States to take action
before exhausting international procedures. The United States, how-
ever, has never resorted to such practice. In a number of cases, the
USTR made recommendations to the President before terminating
international proceedings. Yet, the President has never taken effective
retaliatory action at this interim stage. Instead, he has always
required the USTR "to continue the dispute settlement process." 69
For the most part, actions under section 301 have protected
United States interests. Section 301 works as a threat, providing the
United States with strong "bargaining chips," especially when the pri-
vate petitioner proposes retaliatory measures early in the proceedings.
The Community has not discarded the opportunity to brandish retalia-
tory threats during international proceedings. However, unlike prac-
tices under section 301, neither Community producers nor Member
States may impose such threats during investigation. Articles 11 and
12 of the Regulation specify that the Commission is the sole compe-
tent body to propose retaliatory measures. Depending upon whether
the action is a "response" or an "enforcement," the Commission
makes a proposal to the Council or submits a draft to the Committee.
In any event, the Commission's right of taking initiative is exclusive.
To summarize, the European Regulation grants the Commission
the same power to act that is granted to the United States in section
301. Both the European Community's and United States' approaches
support the legitimacy of resorting to coercive devices during interna-
tional negotiations and dispute settlement procedures. These coercive
devices, however, are not fully consistent with international law when
used against foreign states that have not clearly breached international
obligations. Nevertheless, these devices may prove efficient and better
enable parties to reach mutually satisfactory solutions. In any event,
the aggressive practices of the United States in international inter-
course are becoming prevalent, causing one to wonder if at some point
the United States will have to justify these practices. To a large extent,
the need for justification will depend upon the credibility of the
responsive measures actually contemplated.
B. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
The language of section 301 appears to afford the President more
discretion than the European Regulation allows the Community. Sec-
69. Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws, 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 962 (1983) (state-
ments of Jeanne S. Archibald, Chairman, Section 301 Committee, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative).
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tion 301 authorizes the President to "take all appropriate and feasible
action."' 70 In contrast, article 10(3) of the Regulation limits the
actions of the Community to "any commercial policy measures...
which are compatible with existing international obligations." On its
face, article 10(3) does not authorize the Community to infringe upon
the offender's subjective rights. The Regulation thus appears to pre-
clude actions of reprisal.
The legitimacy of reprisals was a fundamental issue when the
Commission discussed the draft of the Regulation. Following the
objections of certain Member States, the Commission stressed that,
unlike section 301, the proposed Regulation did not authorize meas-
ures incompatible with existing international obligations of the
Community.
This claim is implausible for several reasons. First, article 10(3)
of the Regulation enumerates possible actions that would infringe
upon the subjective rights of trade partners. Article 10(3) explicitly
sanctions "suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting from
commercial policy negotiations, ' 71 the "raising of existing customs
duties or the introduction of any other charge on imports, '72 and "the
introduction of quantitative restrictions or any other measures modify-
ing import or export conditions or otherwise affecting trade with the
third country concerned. ' 73 The formulation "measures... affecting
trade with the third country concerned" 74 approximates the "all
appropriate and feasible action" language of section 301.75 The only
difference is that, unlike the United States, the Community does not
claim the right to take measures outside the field of trade matters.
Second, a response "compatible" with an international obligation
does not have to be "consistent" with the obligation. To satisfy the
requirement of compatibility, the measure need only stand a test of
non-contrariness. Actions are permissible if no rules prohibit them.
Finally, article 10(3) would be nonsensical if it prohibited meas-
ures incompatible with international obligations. As previously dis-
cussed, the only measures "compatible" with international obligations
are either acts of retorsion or reciprocal measures. Neither acts of
retorsion nor reciprocal measures, however, can ensure the full exer-
cise of the Community's rights because they lack the element of coer-
cion that is crucial to enforcement action.
70. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
71. European Regulation, supra note 1, art. 10(3)(a).
72. Id. art. 10(3)(b).
73. Id. art. 10(3)(c).
74. Id. art. 10(3)(c).
75. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
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Neither section 301 nor the European Regulation contemplates
judicial review of the decisions made by the President and by the
Council. 76 The two instruments, however, differ in terms of decision-
making efficiency. Under section 301, the President has exclusive
authority to decide the proper response of the United States. Under
the European Regulation, the decision process is more complex.
The Regulation's procedures differ in the following two situa-
tions. In the first situation, the Council formulates measures to ensure
"full exercise of the Community's rights" "after the conclusion of...
an international procedure." 77 In this situation, the Council must act
by a qualified majority. The European experience, however, has
proved that when sensitive political issues are involved, Member States
act with unanimity. The majority requirement, therefore, may seldom
be used in practice. In the second situation, the Council threatens to
take measures during the course of an international procedure. In this
situation, the Commission representative must submit a draft of the
proposed decision to the Committee. The decision applies if the Coun-
cil voices no formal objections within a fixed period.78 The latter
scheme provides greater efficiency than the former because the Coun-
cil is compelled to give a ruling within a stated time. If the Council
fails to reach a consensus on the Commission's proposed decision, the
Commission's decision applies. Only future practice, however, will
test the effectiveness of the new European Regulation.
CONCLUSION
The comparison of the European Regulation with section 301 of
the United States Trade Act of 1974 reveals that despite differences in
the language of the two instruments, their procedural and substantive
requirements have significant similarities. Moreover, the two instru-
ments share a fundamental quality: each authorizes unilateral and
offensive actions without a prior breach of international obligations by
a foreign state. Both instruments offer more effective measures in
enforcing the rights of the EEC and the United States in foreign trade.
It is doubtful, however, that international law entitles states to
enter into negotiations with the strong "bargaining chips" made per-
missible under section 301 and the European Regulation. Peaceful
settlement of disputes as required in article 33 of the United Nations
76. Under Community law, a decision having a general character cannot be challenged
by an individual unless the decision is of direct concern to that individual. See EEC Treaty,
supra note 8, art. 173(2). Judicial review of presidential actions under section 301 would
probably be precluded under the "political question" doctrine.
77. European Regulation, supra note 1, arts. I 1(2)(b) and 11(3). See also EEC Treaty,
supra note 8, art. 148(2).
78. European Regulation, supra note 1, arts. 1l(2)(a) and 12.
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Charter seems to direct a period of time during which no party enjoys
more rights than others. Such a period of time should be of sufficient
duration to allow the offending state an opportunity to correct its
actions.

